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INDIAN TRIBAL BUSINESSES AND THE OFF-RESERVATION 
MARKET 
by 
Matthew L.M. Fletcher∗ 
American Indian tribes once operated regional trade centers, with broad 
geographical impact. With the arrival of European traders and settlers, this 
system began to erode, and later, the treaty and reservation system effectively 
eliminated the regional Indian economic market. Under the policies of 
measured separatism and assimilation, American Indians had no broad 
geographic power. Recently, as the policy of self-determination has taken 
hold, Indian tribes have begun to assert their economic power through federal 
government contracts, casino gaming, and trade agreements with foreign 
governments. This Article argues that this rising involvement has caused a 
backlash, and that holdover American government policy favoring 
assimilation and dependence threatens to frustrate emerging tribal 
participation in the broader economy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The region where the City of Detroit now rests, as well as the key 
areas around Sault Ste. Marie and St. Ignace in Michigan’s Upper 
Peninsula, used to be, centuries ago, major trading markets for the 
Anishinaabek, the Haudenoshaunee people, and other Algonkian 
peoples. A permanent community of Indian people from all around lived 
near these centers and thrived off of the marketplace, while most Indians 
who traded there would travel to the market periodically from their 
homelands.1 There are places like this all over North America, such as 
Chaco Canyon in New Mexico.2 
The markets changed as French, English, and Spanish traders 
appeared. In Detroit, it appears that the French and English built forts 
and took control of the market, but the market remained.3 Indian people 
adapted to the new market conditions and, in the Great Lakes and 
elsewhere, the Europeans and Indians forged a fur trade that, for a time, 
dominated the economic landscape.4 
However, the Indian presence in a regional market all but ended 
after the treaty and reservation system took hold. In many instances, 
Indians could not leave their reservation lands. In Michigan, if an Indian 
family left its allotment to travel to a market, the land wouldn’t belong to 
the family anymore when they returned due to fraud and theft by white 
land speculators.5 In the Dakota Territory, the United States Army built a 
fence around the reservation to keep Indians in and whites out.6 All over, 
economic and political discrimination all but destroyed Indian 
participation in regional markets. 
Charles Wilkinson coined the term “measured separatism” to 
describe aspects of this policy.7 In general, both Indian tribes and the 
1 See, e.g., W. VERNON KINIETZ, THE INDIANS OF THE WESTERN GREAT LAKES, 1615–
1760, 229–31 (Ann Arbor Paperbacks 1965) (1940). 
2 See, e.g., DAVID E. STANNARD, AMERICAN HOLOCAUST: THE CONQUEST OF THE NEW 
WORLD 25 (1992); Colin Renfrew, Production and Consumption in a Sacred Economy: The 
Material Correlates of High Devotional Expression at Chaco Canyon, 66 AM. ANTIQUITY 14, 
16 (2001). 
3 See, e.g., CHARLES E. CLELAND, RITES OF CONQUEST: THE HISTORY AND CULTURE OF 
MICHIGAN’S NATIVE AMERICANS 114–18 (1992); RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND: 
INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND REPUBLICS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION, 1650–1815, 100, 148–49 
(1991). 
4 See generally Bruce M. White, The Woman Who Married a Beaver: Trade Patterns and 
Gender Roles in the Ojibwa Fur Trade, 46 ETHNOHISTORY 109, 111, 121 (1999). 
5 See, e.g., JAMES A. CLIFTON, GEORGE L. CORNELL & JAMES M. MCCLURKEN, PEOPLE 
OF THE THREE FIRES: THE OTTAWA, POTAWATOMI AND OJIBWAY OF MICHIGAN 34–35 
(1986); Bruce A. Rubenstein, Justice Denied: Indian Land Frauds in Michigan, 1855–
1900, 2 OLD NORTHWEST 131, 134–35 (1976). 
6 See, e.g., PHILIP J. DELORIA, INDIANS IN UNEXPECTED PLACES 15 (Karal Ann 
Marling & Erika Doss eds., 2004). 
7 CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES 
IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 14 (1987). 
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United States pursued measured separatism during the treaty and 
reservation era of the mid-18th century. Indians wanted to be left alone, 
and the United States wanted to avoid bloody conflict between Indian 
people and white settlers and speculators. In theory, measured 
separatism would serve Indians well because they needed a space in 
which to protect themselves from being overwhelmed by non-Indians. 
Of course, measured separatism was a goal and not a reality. 
American Indian policy shifted to assimilation almost as soon as the ink 
on Indian treaties dried.8 Various means of assimilating Indian people—
allotment, boarding schools, law-and-order codes, urban relocation, 
termination, forced-fee patents, and many, many others—came and went 
over the course of a century.9 Interestingly, it appears that while 
American policy had some success in “assimilating” or “civilizing” Indian 
people, often damaging Indian cultures in irreparable ways, it had almost 
no success whatsoever in restoring Indian participation (and 
assimilation) into the American economy. 
Now, tribal self-determination is American Indian policy.10 The goals 
of measured separatism can become close to legal and political reality in 
many parts of Indian Country, with many Indian communities deciding 
for themselves how and when to pursue separatism or openness. Self-
determination opens many doors for Indian communities to enter a 
political, social, and economic world many of these communities have 
not seen in centuries. The primary document of American Indian policy 
that now governs tribal sovereignty remains the Indian Reorganization 
Act (IRA), which expressly gives Indian tribes the option to organize into 
political units and economic units.11 And, at least since the 1970s, 
Congressional policy has supported tribal economic development as a 
means of raising tribal governmental revenue.12 
Some Indian tribes have gone far from home to realize this federal 
policy. A few Alaskan native corporations taking advantage of the Small 
Business Administration’s Business Development Program have 
generated hundreds of millions of dollars by winning and performing 
Defense Department, Homeland Security, and other federal agency 
contracts.13 Some Indian tribes have made millions at home by exploiting 
8 See id. at 19. 
9 See generally 2 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 611–1084 (1984). 
10 See THE HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE 
STATE OF NATIVE NATIONS: CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
18–23 (2008). 
11 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 476–477 (2000). 
12 See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 NEB. 
L. REV. 121, 144–47 (2006). 
13 See Duane Champagne & Carole E. Goldberg, Federal Contracting Support for 
Alaska Natives’ Integration into the Market Economy, UCLA Native Nations Law & Policy 
Center 2–3 (Sept. 13, 2007), http://www.law.ucla.edu/docs/uclanativenationswhite 
_paper_8a_9_13_07.pdf. 
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a market for on-reservation casino gaming created by state law and the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).14 In recent years, tribes that do 
not enjoy a non-Indian gaming market have attempted to tap into 
gaming markets far from their current homelands, without much 
success.15 Some tribes, notably the Navajo Nation, have taken significant 
steps into the global economy by entering into trade agreements with 
foreign nations.16 
A backlash is developing against these new tribal economies and 
business opportunities. Suddenly, American commentators that would 
otherwise promote economic activity across state and national boundary 
lines want tribal businesses to stay home. Even the tribes’ trustee, the 
same that once encouraged tribes to start tribal businesses, is putting the 
brakes on when it comes to the off-reservation market. The Department 
of Interior has made a unilateral decision that it will not approve 
applications for off-reservation Indian gaming except in extremely 
narrow circumstances.17 Of note, the Department of Interior has 
concluded that Indian gaming operations will not assist Indian 
communities unless they help to reduce the on-reservation 
unemployment rate.18 This rationale for denying tribal access to the off-
reservation market is little more than a resurrection of the worst aspects 
of both measured separatism and assimilation. In international trade, we 
would call these rules protectionist. However, simple economics teaches 
us that commercial activity goes where the markets are—and for many 
Indian tribes, the markets are off-reservation. 
Tribal economies once encompassed whole regions of North 
America. Measured separatism, for all its short-term advantages, more or 
less put an end to broad geographic tribal economic activity. It has taken 
many years for tribal economies to reconstitute themselves, and many 
tribes are just barely getting off the ground. Sadly, just as some tribes are 
enjoying the fruits of an off-reservation market, it appears that the efforts 
of other tribes to participate in a global economy will be opposed, and 
perhaps thwarted, by American Indian policy. 
14 See, e.g., STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT & KATHRYN R.L. RAND, INDIAN GAMING & TRIBAL 
SOVEREIGNTY: THE CASINO COMPROMISE 1–12 (2005). 
15 See, e.g., Posting of Kate E. Fort to Turtle Talk, BMIC and Sault Ste. Marie Tribe 
Bills Defeated in the House, http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2008/06/25/bmic-and-
sault-ste-marie-tribe-bills-defeated-in-the-house/ (June 25, 2008); Deb Price, U.S. 
House Rejects 2 Michigan Casinos, DETNEWS.COM, June 26, 2008, 
http://detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080626/POLITICS/806260369. 
16 Robert J. Miller, Inter-Tribal and International Treaties for American Indian 
Economic Development, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1103, 1109 (2008). 
17 See Memorandum from Carl Artman, Assistant Sec’y, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
to Regional Dirs., Bureau of Indian Affairs (Jan. 3, 2008), available at 
http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2008/01/artman0103081.pdf [hereinafter 
Artman Guidance]; see also Gaming on Trust Lands Acquired After October 17, 1988, 
73 Fed. Reg. 29,354 (May 20, 2008) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 292). 
18 See Artman Guidance, supra note 17, at 3–4. 
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II. A HISTORICAL SURVEY OF TRIBAL ECONOMIES 
A. Pre-Contact Local Economies and Regional Trading Centers in Indian North 
America 
It is important to recall that American Indian communities often 
engaged in local and regional trade before contact with European 
nations and people. Roads traveled by foot by the Michigan Anishinaabek 
between the northern lower peninsula and major trade centers in what is 
now Detroit, Grand Rapids, and Saginaw still existed not long ago. One 
of the Three Fires Confederacy—the Odawa people—often were known 
best as regional traders, traveling by canoe to markets that reached far up 
the St. Lawrence River to the east and into the Northern Plains to the 
west.19 
In general, Indian traders living near rivers, major lakes, and seas 
could and did travel great distances to visit other communities and 
engage in trade. In Chaco Canyon, New Mexico, for example, 
researchers have unearthed evidence that the communities there grew 
and developed as trading centers, with people living there for no other 
reason than to facilitate trade.20 There is evidence of similar trading 
centers all over the North American continent.21 
B. Post-Contact Adaptations to Tribal Economies 
After contact but before the American reservation system began to 
dominate American Indian law and policy, tribal economies continued to 
operate. The newest political and economic players—the Europeans—
brought great and terrible change to the Indigenous peoples of this 
country. Indian communities reacted and adapted in various ways to the 
new players; sometimes to their advantage, sometimes not. 
Consider two examples. In the Great Lakes, Indian people reacted to 
the arrival of the French by participating in the French demand for furs 
by acting as the major supplier of valuable furs.22 Great Lakes Indians 
often stopped their long-standing economic activities in order to pursue 
the fur trade and its rewards. Indian cultures changed forever, in both 
good and bad ways. One impact was that Indian hunters nearly rendered 
some animals extinct.23 
19 See CLIFTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 11. 
20 See Renfrew, supra note 2, at 16. 
21 See, e.g., ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 13 (1970) 
(eastern North America); Alan Kolata, In the Realm of the Four Quarters, in AMERICA IN 
1492: THE WORLD OF THE INDIAN PEOPLES BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF COLUMBUS 215, 221 
(Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., ed. 1991) (Andean trading). 
22 See CLIFTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 14–16. 
23 See, e.g., Jeanne Kay, Native Americans in the Fur Trade and Wildlife Depletion, 9 
ENVTL. REV. 118 (1985). 
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In the Great Plains, the arrival of the horse and then later modern 
weaponry—both results of contact with Europeans—pushed the Lakota 
people toward hunting the bison in a manner much different than 
before. Some Great Plains Indian cultures moved more toward following 
the bison herds, until they became far more dependent on these animals 
than before. As the bison headed toward extinction, the Lakota and 
other bison hunters did as well.24 Other tribal economies changed as 
well, in widely varying w
C. Early Federal Indian Policy and Tribal Economies 
Through the Indian Commerce Clause, the Framers of the 
Constitution elevated commerce with Indian tribes to be the primary 
means of regulating affairs (calling it “intercourse”) between Americans 
and Indians.25 The Trade and Intercourse Acts, enacted and reenacted 
from the First Congress until made permanent in 1834, established the 
primacy of trade as the means with which to deal with Indian affairs.26 
The first presidents, especially Washington and Jefferson, sought to exert 
a form of control over Indian people and tribes through trade—with 
trading posts being a key element.27 Of course, the overriding American 
Indian policy was to acquire lands and resources from Indian tribes (as 
opposed to Indian people) at the lowest cost possible.28 
Early American policy sought to pursue these twin goals—peaceful 
property acquisition and control over Indian people through trade—
mostly through treaty negotiations. The Americans implemented and 
enforced Indian treaties in the Southeast and Great Lakes regions, for 
example, using tools of commerce.29 This affected tribal economies in 
fundamental ways. Treaty provisions sought to keep Indians contained on 
smaller and smaller plots of land and regions. Southeast tribes sometimes 
took to farming, and in the case of the Cherokee Nation they were 
successful.30 Northeast tribes that traded with the Americans were not so 
successful in maintaining anything resembling a successful tribal 
economy, subject as they were to ongoing depredations of the American 
traders.31 
24 See Craig S. Galbraith & Curt H. Stiles, Expectations of Indian Reservation Gaming: 
Entrepreneurial Activity Within a Context of Traditional Land Tenure and Wealth Acquisition, 
8 J. DEV. ENTREPRENEURSHIP 93, 104–05 (2003). 
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
26 Act of July 22, 1790, 1 Stat. 137 (1790). 
27 See 1 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 89–114 (1984). 
28 See STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE 
FRONTIER 68–69 (2005). 
29 See 1 PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 115–34. 
30 See, e.g., David M. Wishart, Evidence of Surplus Production in the Cherokee Nation 
Prior to Removal, 55 J. ECON. HIST. 120, 136–37 (1995). 
31 Cf. 1 PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 266–68. 
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D. “Measured Separatism” and the Reservation System 
Charles Wilkinson coined the term “measured separatism” to 
describe much of federal Indian law and policy throughout American 
history. Like any generalization, it has limitations, but it tends to describe 
what Americans and Indians sought in many, many treaties and 
agreements. In part, but perhaps less so than much of federal Indian law 
and policy, measured separatism was an economic plan. Under this 
concept, both Americans and Indians likely presumed that shared 
economic activities would be extremely limited. Indians would have 
hoped for the opportunity to be left alone to pursue economic, political, 
and social activities without the interference of American citizens and 
others.32 Americans would have hoped to keep the Indians away from 
their ongoing pursuit of expansion and economic growth. 
Of course, measured separatism never lasted long. There would 
never be enough resources and space to satisfy the overwhelming 
numbers of American people and businesses, creating demand for 
Indian land and resources preserved in treaty negotiations as soon as the 
ink dried on them, if not earlier. In fact, it appears that non-Indians not 
present at the treaty meetings often assumed that the execution and 
ratification of an Indian treaty meant that the reservation land itself 
would be open for public settlement.33 
Moreover, measured separatism did not bode well for reservation 
economies. Great Lakes tribes retained their on and off-reservation 
hunting, fishing, and gathering rights, but still were forced to enter the 
local labor market.34 As with so many other Indians in the East during the 
first century of the United States, the tribal economy and the subsistence 
culture was destroyed. In the West, Great Plains Indians, often forced to 
live on worthless land, literally fenced in, often depended entirely on 
American military rations guaranteed by treaty.35 
Other reservation economies flourished, only to be undermined by 
federal administrative action. Felix Cohen’s famous rendition of the ways 
that the Bureau of Indian Affairs employees destroyed a successful cattle 
ranching operation at Blackfeet is but one example.36 Other examples 
include Bureau activities to use reservation water supplies to benefit non-
32 See WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 16. 
33 See Richard White, Ethnohistorical Report on the Grand Traverse Ottawas 107 
(1979) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/ 
2008/09/white-ethno-report-pages-56-195.pdf). 
34 E.g., James M. McClurken, Wage Labor in Two Michigan Ottawa Communities, in 
NATIVE AMERICANS AND WAGE LABOR: ETHNOHISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 66–99 (Alice 
Littlefield & Martha C. Knack eds., 1996). 
35 See John P. LaVelle, Rescuing Paha Sapa: Achieving Environmental Justice by 
Restoring the Great Grasslands and Returning the Sacred Black Hills to the Great Sioux Nation, 
5 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 40, 50–52 (2001). 
36 Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950–1953: A Case Study in 
Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L.J. 348, 368–69 (1953). 
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Indians over the intended beneficiaries (the Indians) and simple 
corruption in land tenure and use.37 
E.  Land Tenure, Allotment, and the Indian Reorganization Act 
After the establishment of Indian reservations, Congress turned to a 
land tenure system called “allotment” to destroy the large mass of tribal 
property owned communally. This was a flawed system, to be sure, but an 
economic system. Measured separatism alone, in the view of Congress 
and the Indian administration, might not create conditions allowing for 
the establishment of a self-sufficient tribal reservation economy. 
Moreover, there remained additional demands on Indian lands. 
Allotment, simply described, was the transfer of tribal communally-
owned real property to personal Indian and non-Indian ownership.38 The 
stated policy was to teach Indians how to own land and to live off of that 
land, either through agriculture or the development of its natural 
resources.39 It failed to do so. The administration of allotment disfavored 
most Indians in terms of the lands they could choose to settle, 
guaranteeing from the outset that many Indians would not be able to 
generate much income from the lands.40 Moreover, the underlying 
premise of forcing people to engage in the homesteading of land 
guaranteed a significant percentage of failure—homesteaders 
throughout American history encountered far more failure than success, 
regardless of race.41 
Allotment also signaled a shift in who the American government 
considered the primary tribal representative—from Indian tribe to 
individual Indian. In fact, allotment, by eradicating much of the 
communal reservation land, undermined whatever remained of tribal 
government authority or even tribal governments themselves. One 
example of this paradigm shift from dealing with Indian nations to 
dealing with Indian people could have been the 1871 Act that purported 
to foreclose additional treaty-making;42 however, the federal government 
37 E.g., Scholder v. United States, 428 F.2d 1123, 1130 (9th Cir. 1970). 
38 See generally Kristen A. Carpenter, Contextualizing the Losses of Allotment Through 
Literature, 82 N.D. L. REV. 605, 608–11 (2006); Stacy L. Leeds, By Eminent Domain or 
Some Other Name: A Tribal Perspective on Taking Land, 41 TULSA L. REV. 51, 64–69 (2005). 
39 See THE HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra 
note 10, at 112; Henry L. Dawes, Defense of the Dawes Act, in AMERICANIZING THE 
AMERICAN INDIANS 100, 101 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973). 
40 See History of the Allotment Policy, Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House Comm. on 
Indian Affairs, (statement of Delos Sacket Otis), excerpted in DAVID H. GETCHES, 
CHARLES F. WILKINSON & ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW 166, 169–70 (5th ed. 2004). 
41 See generally Dan Fulton, Failure on the Plains, 51 AGRIC. HIST. 51 (1977); Gary D. 
Libecap & Zeynep Kocabiyik Hansen, “Rain Follows the Plow” and Dryfarming Doctrine: 
The Climate Information Problem and Homestead Failure in the Upper Great Plains, 1890–
1925, 62 J. ECON. HIST. 86, 113 (2002). 
42 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2000). 
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continued making agreements with Indian tribes and then ratifying many 
of them as Acts of Congress.43 Regardless, by reducing tribal governance 
over large portions of land, tribal governments dropped off the map in 
some places. Congress even eliminated some tribal governments; most 
famously, those of the Five Civilized Tribes.44 
The Indian Reorganization Act restored tribal governments to the 
primary Indian actors in federal Indian law and policy. Allotment was an 
unprecedented disaster of federal Indian law and policy, and Congress 
sought to stop the bleeding. Sections 16 and 17 are the core of the IRA in 
this context. Section 16 authorized Indian tribes to organize as 
constitutional governments, in a sort of municipality model of 
governance.45 Section 17, authorizing tribes to form federal economic 
development corporations, also was a major shift, in that it implicitly 
recognized that many Indian tribal governments would not have a stable 
tax base from which to draw upon for government revenue. Section 17 
authorized Indian tribes to become businesses, separate from the 
government itself, creating a vehicle with the purpose of generating 
revenue for the government.46 It is not clear if Congress intended Section 
17 corporate business activities to be relegated to on-reservation activity 
alone, or if Congress assumed tribal corporations would move off-
reservation.47 In any event, Congress and the Internal Revenue Service 
continue to treat Section 17 corporate income as exempt from federal 
(and state) taxes, likely because of the federal policy encouraging tribal 
business development.48 
The model of tribal government qua tribal business endures in the 
modern era as well. The most explicit Congressional statements of policy 
supporting this model are found in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,49 
the Tribal Tax Status Act,50 and other federal tribal economic 
development-related statutes dating from the 1970s and later.51 
43 See George William Rice, Indian Rights: 25 U.S.C. § 71: The End of Indian 
Sovereignty or a Self-Limitation of Contractual Ability?, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 239, 247 
(1977). 
44 Stacy L. Leeds, Defeat or Mixed Blessing? Tribal Sovereignty and the State of Sequoyah, 
43 TULSA L. REV. 5, 8 (2007). 
45 25 U.S.C. § 476 (2000). 
46 Id. § 477. 
47 Cf. ELMER R. RUSCO, A FATEFUL TIME: THE BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT 263 (2000) (noting a dearth of legislative 
history on Section 17). 
48 See 26 U.S.C. § 7871(a); Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19. 
49 25 U.S.C. § 2701–2702. 
50 Id. § 7871(a). 
51 Fletcher, supra note 12, at 145–46. 
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III. MODERN INDIAN AFFAIRS: GLOBAL  
COMMERCE OR PROTECTIONISM 
The rise of tribal self-determination from the 1970s to the present 
has restored some of the luster of measured separatism. Now Indian 
people and communities have options—and are engaging in the 
progressive process of nation-building. With the rise of tribal self-
governance, assisted greatly by tribal economic development, Indian 
people living in urban areas far from their homelands have more 
opportunities if they return. Indian children are more likely to be 
educated at home while having more opportunities to leave to attend 
universities, and graduate, and professional schools as they grow up. 
Indian governments now have the authority and the wherewithal to 
reintroduce the notion of measured separatism into their strategic 
planning, if they so choose. 
Some tribes, such as the Mashantucket Pequot, have the ability and 
resources to maintain the personal privacy of tribal members and to keep 
internal governmental decision-making secure.52 Other tribes have 
maintained a more measured separatism over time. For example, some of 
the desert Southwest tribes and pueblos have been able to reinforce their 
separatism, while also encouraging a thriving non-Indian tourist and 
gaming trade.53 Unlike the measured separatism of the treaty era, which 
often led to the creation of literal barriers between Indians and non-
Indians, modern measured separatism often allows tribes to maintain 
their own private communities while they engage in sophisticated 
commercial and political activities involving non-Indians. Each tribe, in 
theory, is free to craft its own relationship with non-Indians. 
Some non-Indians have long opposed the very presence of Indian 
tribes in the United States. Many American citizens only grudgingly 
accept local, state, and federal government taxation, regulations, and 
authority. These citizens often refuse to accept any form of tribal 
government authority. Many non-Indians have opposed the continuing 
treaty rights of Indian tribes and Indian people. Even more oppose these 
rights when they extend outside of Indian Country. Since Congress long 
ago authorized and encouraged Indian tribes to seek out opportunities 
to create economic growth as a means of funding Indian Country’s 
government services, recognizing tax breaks and regulatory immunities 
that tribal businesses sometimes enjoy, many non-Indians have opposed 
tribal businesses. When tribal businesses maintain their operations within 
Indian Country, opponents have argued that these businesses have unfair 
competitive advantages. Opponents sometimes link these advantages to 
52 See STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT & KATHRYN R.L. RAND, INDIAN GAMING AND TRIBAL 
SOVEREIGNTY: THE CASINO COMPROMISE 106–10 (2005). 
53 See generally Angela A. Gonzales, Thomas A. Lyson & K. Whitney Mauer, What 
Does a Casino Mean to a Tribe? Assessing the Impact of Casino Development on Indian 
Reservations in Arizona and New Mexico, 44 SOC. SCI. J. 405 (2007). 
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race as a rhetorical means of denouncing them. But when tribal 
businesses exploit off-reservation markets, opposition commentary 
becomes much more vociferous. 
The two most recent examples of opposition to off-reservation tribal 
business operations are in the areas of Indian gaming and federal 
government contracting. Opposition to off-reservation gaming has taken 
the form of a backlash, in the words of Senator McCain,54 with opponents 
accusing tribes and their business partners of “reservation shopping” for 
purposes of exploiting urban, non-Indian markets.55 Opposition to tribal 
corporations that engage in federal contracting under the Small Business 
Administration’s business development program accuse tribal businesses 
of exploiting race-based economic opportunities far from their 
homelands.56 
The common denominator of these arguments against off-
reservation tribal business operations is the resurrection of the form that 
measured separation took during treaty times—the physical distance or 
barrier between Indians and non-Indians. In sum, this argument suggests 
that Indians can engage in any kind of business operations they like, so 
long as they do so only within their current land base. 
In the context of off-reservation gaming, the Assistant Secretary of 
Interior issued a “guidance” in the form of a public memorandum to the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs limiting the discretion of the Bureau to take 
land into trust for the purpose of off-reservation gaming.57 It was 
unsurprising for the Assistant Secretary to order the Bureau to take a 
harder look at tribal off-reservation gaming proposals in the current 
political climate and administration, but the rationale—that Indian 
people will not benefit, and may even suffer, from the expansion of off-
reservation gaming—is simply incorrect as a matter of law, history, and 
reality. 
54 151 CONG. REC. S13390 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2005) (statement of Sen. McCain). 
55 See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Bringing Balance to Indian Gaming, 44 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 39, 66–71 (2007). 
56 See Patience Wait, Tribal Companies’ Edge Stirring a Backlash?, GOV’T COMPUTER 
NEWS, Jan. 24, 2005, http://www.gcn.com/print/24_2/34876-1.html?topic= 
procurement#. 
57 See Artman Guidance, supra note 17; Gaming on Trust Lands Acquired After 
October 17, 1988, 73 Fed. Reg. at 29,354 (May 20, 2008) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. 
pt. 292). 
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IV. THE DEVELOPMENT AND SURVIVAL OF TRIBAL ECONOMIES IN 
THE OFF-RESERVATION MARKET 
A. Reconciling Federal Indian Law and Policy with Modern Tribal Economic 
Development Realities 
The recent guidance issued in the form of a letter from the Assistant 
Secretary of Indian Affairs58—and the Final Rule adopted thereafter59—
indicates that the federal government’s view is that, at least in the context 
of Indian gaming, the off-reservation market more than approximately 
25 miles beyond current reservations’ boundaries is all but closed. This is 
unsurprising, given that federal officials have long argued that the 
framers of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act never would have assumed 
Indian tribes would be so persistent in seeking off-reservation gaming 
opportunities. But the stated public policy behind the limit is not tied to 
federal Indian gaming policy—it is linked to the notion of measured 
separatism. In part, the Artman guidance appears to assume that the 
Termination Era economic policy favoring urban relocation of 
reservation Indians is an anathema and is usually considered a failure, 
but not one on the level of, say, allotment or boarding school-based 
education policy. The government in the guidance equates off-
reservation gaming in some small way with urban relocation in implying 
that reservation Indians will go to where the opportunities are—and in 
the context of off-reservation gaming, they will leave the reservation. The 
government, invoking the bad memories of urban relocation, suggests 
that this is a reason to deny off-reservation gaming proposals. 
Reservation Indian life and opportunity has long been a focus (off 
and on) of federal and tribal policymakers. Felix Cohen wrote in 1939 
that making the reservation livable was a key ingredient in the IRA and in 
maintaining a successful federal Indian policy.60 But Cohen, the primary 
drafter of the original version of the IRA, also wanted Indian tribes to 
take advantage of whatever economic opportunities came along, perhaps 
even those outside of Indian Country. But he kept his own counsel on the 
question of the off-reservation market. 
The problem in both the IRA and IGRA is Congressional silence. 
Congress didn’t say in 1934 or in 1988 whether it had an opinion on 
tribal business activities in the off-reservation market. Legislative history 
and the subjective intent of the framers of the legislation aside, the 
statutory text is utterly silent. How do we proceed? 
Well, we could proceed by ignoring federal Indian law and policy in 
the first instance. We are talking about businesses, often federally 
58 Artman Guidance, supra note 17. 
59 Gaming on Trust Lands Acquired After October 17, 1988, 73 Fed. Reg. at 
29,354. 
60 See Felix S. Cohen, How Long Will Indian Constitutions Last?, in THE LEGAL 
CONSCIENCE: SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN 222, 225 (Lucy Kramer Cohen ed., 
Archon Books 1970) (1960). 
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chartered corporations, not just governments. They have limitations, 
including a paucity of adequate capital and financing opportunities, 
tribal government politics and inexperience, and usually a poor home 
economic market. Any business in that situation has no option but to 
look elsewhere. It is axiomatic. 
But that’s not what will happen as a matter of reality, both legally and 
politically. Tribal businesses have powerful political and economic 
opponents at all levels of government and elsewhere. Federal and state 
courts are deeply concerned that tribal businesses may be exploiting 
market exemptions, operating on anything but a level playing field. 
Tribal businesses, in the end, will find it extraordinarily hard to enter and 
compete in the off-reservation market under these circumstances. 
B. A Schumpeterian Warning? 
Recent commentators on Indian gaming in California worry that the 
rise of the tribal gaming industry has frightening parallels to the rise and 
devastating fall of the bison trade in the Great Plains after the 
introduction of the horse. Relying on dated anthropology, perhaps, these 
commentators noted that the Great Plains Indians did not hunt the 
buffalo to the extent that the Indian communities became dependent on 
the animal until after the use of horses and, later, guns became more 
prevalent.61 Had the American military and settlers not quickened the 
pace dramatically, according to this research, the Great Plains Indians 
could have hunted the buffalo to extinction or something close to it 
eventually. 
This version of history may or may not be true. What is relevant is the 
warning. The commentators that raise the story applied a Schumpeterian 
economic development analysis to Indian gaming.62 Schumpeter noted 
that economic development, in general, arises when a great disruption 
occurs.63 It could be the invention of a new gadget like the cotton gin or 
the discovery of massive gold or oil deposits in a region (these are 
examples of the kinds of disruptions that led to American economic 
growth at the expense of Indian people and others). Schumpeter posits 
that economies are circular, that all the goods, services, and money with 
which to transact those services are rotating in a sort of zero sum game.64 
Economic development occurs when a player in the economic circle 
invests some of its capital in a new economic activity or opportunity 
encouraged or created by the disruption (to the player’s immediate 
short-term disadvantage), and has success. Value is generated in an 
inherent or intrinsic manner, and it spreads to others, creating extrinsic 
61 See Galbraith & Stiles, supra note 24, at 104–05. 
62 Id. at 106. 
63 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 65–67 
(Redvers Opie trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (1934). 
64 Id. at 61–62. 
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value as well. Contrarily, development does not necessarily occur when 
the disruption creates a temporary windfall for a player, negating the 
import of the new investment. The overall value of the economic circle 
does not necessarily grow, but wealth or value merely shifts to one player 
from other players. Often this is at the expense of others, for example, 
others who were attempting to exploit a market that suddenly dried up to 
the benefit of another player. The buffalo story offers an example of this 
scenario. 
The commentators did not argue that Indian gaming is destined for 
doom, but they had a difficult time finding evidence of increased overall 
economic growth. They did find some increased small business activity 
from tribal members and drew positive conclusions from that evidence, 
but acknowledged that the evidence was thin.65 At one point, they noted 
that Indian gaming appeared to be very similar to a mere windfall, like an 
oil strike.66 
So then, is the gaming industry not an engine of economic 
development for Indian tribes in the same way that it was in Las Vegas, 
Monaco, and other successful gaming communities? Is it just rearranging 
wealth on a temporary basis without creating new wealth? 
Surely there is evidence that Indian gaming creates some new 
wealth, here and there. Any Indian tribe or tribal gaming advocacy group 
that has funded economic research into the benefits of Indian gaming 
will be able to demonstrate enormous wealth transfers from non-Indians 
to Indians (Indian tribes, at least). These studies will also employ 
“multipliers” to assert that there must be extrinsic benefits, too. Non-
Indians and Indians alike stop accepting unemployment benefits or even 
come off welfare when they begin working at the new tribal casino; 
commercial activity (mostly services) increases in the area of the casino, 
plus vendors offer direct goods and services to the casino itself. Casino 
employees make more money, spend it, and send some of it to state and 
federal (and sometimes tribal) governments in the form of taxes.67 But 
one could find reverse multipliers in the areas vacated by commerce that 
lose when the tribal casino opens, not to mention the increase in 
gambling addiction and (arguably) the increase in crime attendant to 
casinos.68 Some argue vehemently that gaming is a wash at best; or an 
economic and social cancer at worst. 
65 See Galbraith & Stiles, supra note 24, at 108. 
66 Id. at 108–09. 
67 See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and 
Chippewa Indians et al. at 11–26, Taxpayers of Mich. Against Casinos v. State, 685 
N.W.2d 221 (Mich. 2004) (No. 122830), available at http://courts.michigan.gov/ 
supremecourt/Clerk/03-04/122830/122830-Amicus-GrTraverse.pdf (discussing the 
various benefits of Indian gaming). 
68 See generally James P. Hill, The New Buffalo: A Comparative Examination of 
Tribal Casino Gaming in Michigan, 1993–2003 (Nov. 5, 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2008/07/casino-
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But for Indian gaming to generate significant and sustainable 
economic development there must be more. And that is one of the 
reasons Indian tribes and their business partners are looking to expand 
into the off-reservation market. The question then becomes—would 
tapping into the off-reservation market constitute real Schumpeterian 
economic development? 
Galbraith and Stiles worry that it is not.69 In the first instance, the 
market for Indian gaming is intertwined with politics. As Kevin Washburn 
noted, there would be no Indian gaming market if each individual state 
banned all forms of gambling within its borders.70 IGRA exists because of 
this circumstance. Instead, states took political action in the 1980s to 
protect non-Indian gaming interests already present within many states, 
rather than flatly prohibiting all gaming. Now, it is clear that most states 
(rhetoric aside) simply want a greater and greater cut of Indian gaming 
proceeds, rather than seeking to eliminate it. Many have even licensed 
additional non-Indian gaming operations. The contours of the Indian 
gaming market on both a local and the national level are driven by 
politics. This is a weak link in the chain to demonstrating sustainable, 
Schumpeterian economic development. 
C. The Off-Reservation Market 
The Schumpeterian model of economic development may have 
useful import for analyzing tribal economies. Schumpeter taught that 
economies are circular. But his theory assumes that the circle is inclusive. 
However, Congress and Indian people often intended federal Indian law 
and policy, at various times and circumstances, to close the circle; 
keeping reservation economies (and societies) separate, in part, from the 
rest of the American (and global) economy. 
Although the circle was never really closed, that often was the intent. 
And reservation economies were and are stilted by the legal and political 
isolation (not to mention geography). The wealth of the closed 
reservation economy circle did not grow horizontally or vertically. It is 
only in recent years—perhaps the last decade or more—that reservation 
economies have begun to integrate with the outside. This is a function of 
at least two important developments in federal Indian law and policy: (1) 
Indian gaming, and (2) increased self-governance over reservation 
natural resources. Finally, there is something valuable on-reservation that 
draws non-Indians and encourages non-Indians to invest or spend within 
Indian Country. 
It is fair to say that these developments (Schumpeterian disruptions) 
are not going to generate true Schumpeterian economic development 
report-final-version-revised-11-5-07.pdf (looking for negatives to tribal gaming and 
finding inconclusive evidence). 
69 See Galbraith & Stiles, supra note 24, at 108–09. 
70 See Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Law, State Policy, and Indian Gaming, 4 NEV. L. J. 
285, 286 (2003–2004). 
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without more. In many ways, these disruptions open the door to the off-
reservation market, but there must be some form of investment in new 
opportunities, creating new disruptions that tribal interests can exploit. 
It is easy to say, as every commentator has since the beginning, that 
tribes must diversify from their reliance on gaming and natural 
resources. I agree with that proposition, of course. 
That brings us to the beginning. The current crisis in Indian gaming 
is the so-called Artman Guidance, an informal administrative ruling 
seeking to restrict off-reservation gaming, and the Final Rule that 
followed in May 2008.71 Dozens of tribes with off-reservation gaming 
proposals in varying stages of development have sought to counter this 
move—a long time in the works, frankly—with legal and political 
action.72 Surely the government’s argument as to why it is moving to 
restrict off-reservation gaming is grounded in federal Indian law and 
policy—selectively grounded, of course. The government’s failings here 
are clear. It is a patent restoration of measured separatism at a time when 
tribal economies are expanding into the off-reservation market. It is also 
a tortured reading of the IGRA and its legislative history.73
But the guidance is an opportunity for close scrutiny of tribal 
economies in the context of the off-reservation market. In short, the 
question is: why do Indian tribes want to go off-reservation? 
The answer is found in the increasing economic irrationality of 
measured separatism. Using Schumpeterian terms, measured separatism 
created a closed circle of economic activity in Indian Country, which can 
be measured by capital and the value of resources within the circle. 
Within the circle now, using principles of federal Indian law, there are 
certain advantages to tribal business people. State regulation and 
taxation may be preempted or limited. Tribal business laws and 
regulatory environments might contain additional advantages. But it 
should be remembered that these factors derive in large part from 
measured separatism, a closed circle. There is extremely limited 
Schumpeterian value in a closed circle. Money flows around, but it does 
not grow. A strong argument, perhaps not dispositive, can be made that 
on-reservation tribal economic development, be it gaming or resource 
development, is nothing much more than moving money around within 
71 Artman Guidance, supra note 17; Gaming on Trust Lands Acquired After 
October 17, 1988, 73 Fed. Reg. at 29,354 (May 20, 2008) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. 
pt. 292). 
72 See Complaint, Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. Dept. of Interior, No. 
1:08-cv-00950-WCG (E.D. Wis. Nov. 7, 2008), available at http://turtletalk.files. 
wordpress.com/2008/11/menominee-v-doi-complaint.pdf; St. Croix Chippewa 
Indians of Wisconsin v. Kempthorne, No. 1:07-cv-02210-RJL (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2008), 
available at https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2007cv2210-48. 
73 For a compelling critique of the Artman Guidance, see Posting of Bryan 
Newland to Turtle Talk, Department of Interior Changes Fee-to-Trust Process, 
http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2008/01/08/department-of-interior-changes-fee-to-
trust-process/ (Jan. 8, 2008). 
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the circle, money already located within Indian Country. In some 
circumstances, namely resource development, the economic 
development historically has been a terrible drain of capital away from 
Indian Country, and only in recent decades has this drain slowed.74 
The economic success stories highlighted over the years by the 
Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development 
demonstrate many critical things. But perhaps the most important, 
although often hidden and implicit, is that Indian business interests do 
not necessarily look first to the advantages and contours of federal Indian 
law when developing their business models. They look to the market first. 
That’s where the money is. Federal Indian law, with its significant basis in 
measured separatism, is not designed to encourage the importation of 
outside capital. Successful tribal businesses bring in outside capital, and 
also go to where the capital is located. Thus, it is unsurprising that tribal 
businesses like gaming operations make efforts to go where the better 
markets are located; that is, off-reservation. 
Federal government pronouncements like the Artman Guidance, to 
be codified in 25 C.F.R. Part 292’s territorial limitation, create yet 
another closed circle, just one slightly larger than before. Indian tribes 
are right to rally against rules like this one, but they must remember that 
these kinds of rules derive from measured separatism. And they 
demonstrate that federal Indian law and the economic development 
derived from its principles, limits tribal business opportunities. There is 
something there, and it should be tapped, but it has limits. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The pre-American trading centers of the Great Lakes—Sault Ste. 
Marie, Michilimackinac, and Detroit—developed as natural 
manifestations of economic activity involving the Indigenous peoples of 
the region, as well as the French, the British, and lastly the Americans. In 
many ways, during that period, the Indian people controlled these 
markets. As history turned against the Indians, the Europeans acquired 
control of these markets. The federal Indian law and policy manifestation 
of this control can be explained in the phrase “measured separatism.” 
While measured separatism had value for Indian and American 
communities for a time, as well as serious disadvantages, the need for 
Indian law controls over the market has receded significantly. 
The recent limitations on off-reservation gaming are manifestations 
of this measured separatism. These controls should be a call for tribal 
business interests to drop some of their reliance on federal Indian law, 
which creates some economic advantages, and re-enter the larger 
economic world. 
74 See generally Judith V. Royster, Tribal Economic Development and Mineral Resources: 
Practical Sovereignty, Political Sovereignty, and the Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-
Determination Act, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1065 (2008). 
